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I N T H E U T A H C 0 U R T 0 F A P P E A L S 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No, 890268-CA 
v. i 
RONALD GEORGE STORRS, : ratngory No 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal I s from a conviction of possession of a 
cont xc>] led si lbst ai ice, a second degree felony, under Utah Cr -
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized 
from his person after his arrest. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory 
provisions pertinent to the i eso] uti 01 i nl t he i ssue presented uri 
appeal i s contained i n the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rmidi i HI <;enn|t« stnn f , wai i ha i«n" i wi'li •wo 
counts of possession ol a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, under Utah Code ~ * 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989), and 
• ^  , Pursuant 
to a plea bargain, defendant entered and the trial court accepted 
a plea of no contest to one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (R. 74-85). The court sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State 
Prison and ordered that he pay a $1,000 fine plus $250 to the 
Victim Reparations Fund, but stayed execution of the prison term 
and placed defendant on eighteen months' probation (R. 105-06). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence seized in a search of his person incident to arrest. 
On November 30, 1988, several police officers executed 
a search warrant at a residence in which defendant was present. 
That warrant authorized the search of the residence, two 
vehicles, and M[a]ny person in the residence or any person 
arriving at the residence during the search" for evidence of drug 
2 
possession, use, and distribution. Upon entering the residence, 
two police officers, Officer Caldwell and Officer Blackhurst, 
observed defendant in a hallway between the kitchen and a 
bathroom. Another man lay in the doorway of the bathroom, his 
feet inside and upper body outside in the hallway; a syringe lay 
next to him on the floor. The officers estimated that defendant 
was approximately three to five feet from the bathroom and the 
man on the floor when they first saw defendant (R. 139-41, 145, 
Pursuant to defendant's motion, the court sentenced him to a 
third degree felony term. 
2 
The original of the warrant apparently was never offered or 
received into evidence in the trial court. However, the parties 
and the court appear to have agreed to proceed with a copy of the 
warrant, which is contained in the record on appeal (R. 66-70). 
147# 149-51, 156). 
Officer Caldwell proceeded downstairs where he and 
other officers discovered two individuals smoking cocaine out of 
a can. They also found quantities of cocaine and LSD as well as 
Debbie Nielsen, the owner of the residence, whom they arrested 
for several drug offenses. Meanwhile, Officer Blackhurst engaged 
defendant in the upstairs hallway, indicating that he was a 
police officer there to execute a search warrant. Defendant 
responded by laughing at Blackhurst. Concluding that defendant 
was "high on something," Blackhurst handcuffed him, conducted a 
pat-down search of him for weapons (discovering nothing), and 
placed him in the custody of an Officer Frampton who took 
defendant to a front room for security observation. Frampton 
described defendant's demeanor as "quiet and mellow" after 
defendant had been handcuffed and had calmed down (R. 141, 149-
51, 157). 
After Officer Caldwell returned upstairs from the 
basement, Officer Frampton formally arrested defendant "for being 
in possession of cocaine" and conducted a pat-down search in 
which a small quantity of a white powdery substance was found in 
one of defendant's pockets (R. 142, 158-59). 
Referring to what the officers knew prior to entering 
the residence with the search warrant, Officer Caldwell testified 
as follows: 
[W]e had made several undercover narcotics 
buys out of the residence already, and we 
knew that every time that we entered that 
residence with, or our undercover police 
officers entered the residence, that there 
were several people present, none of which we 
knew who they were. The, generally, most of 
the people were different each time the 
undercover officers went there. We knew that 
drugs were being sold in large quantities 
from the residence and that several people 
were frequenting that residence, including 
juveniles. 
(R. 143). 
Prior to entering his plea of no contest, defendant 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person 
after his arrest. He argued that, under the fourth amendment, 
the search of defendant was unlawful because (1) it was beyond 
the scope of the search authorized by the warrant, and (2) there 
was no independent probable cause upon which the police could 
justify a warrantless search of defendant (R. 20, 36-39, 161-63). 
The State argued that the search of defendant which resulted in 
the seizure of the suspected contraband was justified as a search 
incident to defendant's lawful arrest (R. 41-45, 160-61). In a 
memorandum decision, the trial court denied the motion to 
suppress, ruling that, although the search of defendant could not 
be supported by the search warrant alone or justified as a search 
for dangerous weapons (an exception to the warrant requirement as 
recognized by this Court in State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)), it 
was sustainable as a search incident to a lawful arrest (R. 46-
65). 
After denial of the motion to suppress, defendant 
entered and the court accepted a no contest plea (R. 83-85). 
. i . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress because the challenged evidence was lawfully seized 
incident to an arrest supported by probable cause. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Defendant appeals after entry and acceptance of his no 
contest plea. A plea of no contest, although it indicates only 
that the defendant does not challenge the charges in the 
information or indictment, has the same effect as a plea of 
guilty. Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-2(3) (1982). It is settled law 
that a voluntary guilty plea or no contest plea is a waiver of 
the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional violations (e.g., 
fourth amendment issues). State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 
1978) (per curiam); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977). 
However, in Sery, this Court created an exception to this general 
rule, stating that 
[it) is inapplicable where . . . the plea 
entered by the defendant with the consent of 
the prosecution and accepted by the trial 
judge specifically preserves the suppression 
issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the 
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of 
suppression are accepted by the appellate 
court. 
The opinion in State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), was withdrawn prior to publication in the Pacific 
Reporter because the Court subsequently learned that Mclntire had 
actually entered a conditional plea and therefore, under Sery, 
was not precluded from raising fourth amendment issues on appeal. 
State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The State cites the first Mclntire opinion not as published 
precedent, but simply for its discussion of waiver of pre-plea 
constitutional violations. 
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758 P.2d at 938 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). Under this standard, in the instant case there may be 
some question of whether a conditional no contest plea which 
preserved suppression issues for review was actually accepted by 
the trial court. The only reference in the record to 
preservation of those issues for review appears in the trial 
court's signed minute entry regarding the taking of the plea. 
There, the court stated: 
Mr. Means [defendant's counsel] addressed 
the Court and indicated this matter has been 
discussed at length by counsel and the 
defendant now intends to enter a plea of No 
Contest to Count 4 of the Information 
reserving the right to appeal the Court's 
ruling on the Motion to Suppress. Counsel 
also indicated he has discussed the matter 
with the defendant and the defendant has 
initialled the "Statement in Advance of 
Plea.11 
(R. 83). Defendant's signed statement for the plea does not 
explicitly preserve suppression issues for appeal; defendant 
merely crossed-out and did not initial paragraph 10(F) which 
reads: HI am giving up my right to appeal the verdict of the 
Court" (R. 77). Thus, it is not entirely clear from the minute 
entry or defendant's signed statement that the prosecution 
consented to and the trial court accepted a conditional no 
contest plea that "specifically preservefd] the suppression issue 
for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's 
arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate 
court.- Sery# 758 P.2d at 938. Given the unique nature of the 
•6-
conditional plea approved by the majority in Sery, it is 
extremely important that the record on appeal clearly reflect 
that such a conditional plea has been entered with the 
prosecution's consent and that the court has accepted the same. 
Defendant did not carefully comply with the requirements of Sery, 
in that he failed to create an explicit record on the conditional 
plea. 
Despite the deficiency in the record, the State will 
address defendant's arguments regarding denial of his suppression 
motion. It does so because the record as a whole probably is at 
least marginally adequate to establish that defendant entered and 
the trial court accepted a conditional plea pursuant to Sery. 
However, this should not preclude the Court from declining to 
reach the suppression issue, if it concludes that there was 
inadequate compliance with Sery. At the very least, the Court 
should admonish future defendants desiring to enter conditional 
pleas pursuant to Sery to provide a more explicit record on the 
matter than that provided in the instant case. 
Finally, because defendant did not raise or develop in 
the trial court the state constitutional argument under article 
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution that he now advances on 
appeal, the state constitutional question should not be addressed 
by this Court. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. 
4 
A conditional plea of the sort approved in Sery is not 
expressly authorized by statute or rule, and has never been 
approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Indeed, there is some 
question about how that court would rule on the issue if 
presented with it. See Sery, 758 P.2d at 949-50 (Davison, J., 
dissenting) (where Judge Davidson presents a thoughtful argument 
against the conditional plea approved by the majority). 
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App. 1989). Accordingly, the State does not address this 
question. Defendant's explanation that that issue was not argued 
or briefed below because there is no case law upon which to 
develop an argument under article I, section 14, is not 
persuasive. Indeed, his citation to State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1986), where the Utah Supreme Court suggested an analytic 
technique that could be employed in the analysis of state 
constitutional issues, id. at 806 (citing State v. Jewett, 500 
A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985)), defeats that very argument. Although there 
may not be any Utah appellate decisions directly on point, an 
argument for an interpretation of article I, section 14 different 
from that given the fourth amendment obviously can be made with 
Jewett's technique and by reference to case law from other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 
P.2d 136 (1984) (rejecting the United States Supreme Court's 
fourth amendment analysis in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983), and retaining "Aguilar-Spinelli test" on state 
constitutional grounds); People v. Bigelow, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 
636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 (1985) (rejecting on state 
constitutional grounds the "good faith exception" to the 
exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984)). 
_ Q _ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS; THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT 
WHICH RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED 
CONTRABAND WAS JUSTIFIED AS A SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO A LAWFUL ARREST. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress because the police officers did not have 
probable cause to arrest him, thereby rendering the subsequent 
search unconstitutional. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, 
this Court applies the following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
The trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. However, 
in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
"correction of error" standard. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(citations omitted). But see State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-
69 (Utah 1987), State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 
1985); and State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (which suggest that the "clearly erroneous" standard of 
review applies to both the trial court's factual determination 
and its legal conclusion). Because the facts surrounding 
defendant's arrest and the subsequent search of his person 
generally are not in dispute, this Court need only assess the 
trial court'8 legal conclusion that the search was 
constitutional. 
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In his brief, defendant concedes that "his initial 
brief detention and pat-down was reasonable for the safety of the 
officers conducting the search and to secure the premises." Br. 
of App. at 9. However, he claims the search of his person which 
occurred at the time of his arrest violated the fourth amendment 
5 
because the arrest was not supported by probable cause. In 
making this claim, defendant focuses on the question of whether 
there was probable cause to believe defendant possessed cocaine, 
the basis upon which the arresting officers stated they made the 
arrest. That question will be addressed first. 
In State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989), this Court stated: 
Another exception to the warrant 
requirement permits a search incident to a 
lawful arrest. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(1988) provides authority for peace officers 
to make an arrest with or without a warrant. 
The standard for evaluating an arrest for an 
offense not committed in the officer's 
presence is an objective one: "[WJhether 
from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense." 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 
495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Utah 1972)). The law 
enforcement officer need not have "certain 
knowledge of the guilt of the suspect." 
Hatcher at 1260. A valid arrest occurs 
whenever "a crime under which the arrest is 
made and a crime for which probable cause 
exists are in some fashion related. . . . " 
By agreeing with the trial court's rejection of the warrant and 
the "dangerous weapon" exception to the warrant requirement (see 
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, 
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)) as bases for upholding the 
search, defendant also argues that they are not alternative 
grounds to justify the search. Br. of App. at 9. 
Mills v. Wainwriqht, 415 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 
1969)- . • . 
762 P.2d at 1111. The Court also noted: 
There is, however, an important distinction 
between the evidence required for conviction 
and that required to constitute sufficient 
probable cause for arrest. As stated in 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 
S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949): 
The court's rulings . . . illus-
trate the difference in standards 
and latitude allowed in passing 
upon the distinct issues of 
probable cause and guilt. Guilt in 
a criminal case must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt and by 
evidence confined to that which 
long experience in the common-law 
tradition . . . has crystallized 
into rules of evidence consistent 
with that standard. . . . However, 
if those standards were to be made 
applicable in determining probable 
cause for arrest or for search and 
seizure . . . few indeed would be 
the situations in which an officer, 
charged with protecting the public 
interest in enforcing the law, 
could take effective action toward 
that end. 
Id. at 174, 69 S.Ct. at 1310. 
762 P.2d at 1112. Under these standards, although perhaps a 
somewhat close question, the officers had probable cause to 
arrest defendant for the offense of possession of cocaine or some 
other controlled substance (see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1989)). As the trial court summarized in its memorandum 
6
 Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) provides: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order or directly from 
-11-
decision: 
In this case the officers had actual 
knowledge and probable cause to believe that 
illegal drugs were being used in and 
distributed from the premises in which 
defendant was found; a substantial amount of 
suspected illegal drugs and drug 
paraphernalia were found on the premises, a 
significant part of which was in close 
proximity to the defendant; the officers knew 
that a different group and variety of people 
frequented said premises for no apparent 
reason other than to obtain illegal drugs; 
officer Blackhurst perceived that the 
defendant appeared to be "high" on something; 
and Officer Frampton observed that after an 
initial period of agitation, the defendant 
became "mellow.M 
(R. 64). From these facts, the officers, who had experience in 
7 
drug investigations, would be justified in believing that 
defendant possessed cocaine or some other controlled substance. 
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the officers 
did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for possession 
under S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), they clearly had probable cause to 
arrest defendant for a violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-
8(2)(a)(ill) (Supp. 1989). That section provides that it is 
unlawful 
Cont. a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this subsection[.] 
7 
The experience and expertise of trained law enforcement 
officers is a significant factor in assessing whether probable 
cause existed, since a trained officer is often able to perceive 
and articulate meaning in conduct that would be wholly innocent 
to the untrained observer. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 
(1979); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
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for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
be present where controlled substances are 
being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use of possession is open, 
obvious, apparent, and not concealed from 
those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the 
evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or 
assist anyone else to do so; any incidence of 
prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut 
this defense[.] 
Plainly, given the situation that existed in the residence upon 
the officers' arrival, coupled with their knowledge that the 
residence was frequently the scene of illegal drug use and 
possession, the officers could reasonably have believed that 
defendant was knowingly and intelligently present where 
controlled substances were being unlawfully and openly used and 
possessed. That there may not have been any evidence to 
establish with a high level of certainty that defendant either 
used the controlled substance himself or advised, encouraged, or 
assisted someone else to do so, such evidence is not necessary to 
constitute probable cause to arrest for a violation of S 58-37-
8(2)(a)(iii). The second clause of that subsection relates only 
to evidence pertinent to conviction, not the establishment of 
probable cause to arrest. As Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 174 (1949) (cited and quoted by this Court in Ayala, 762 
P.2d at 1112) makes clear, "there is a significant difference 
between the quantum of evidence required for conviction and that 
required to constitute sufficient probable cause for an arrest;" 
much less evidence is required for probable cause to arrest. 
State v. Richards, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 
-H-
1989). Furthermore, that the officers did not specify a 
violation of S 58-37-8(2)(a)(iii) as a basis for their arrest of 
defendant (indeed, they specifically stated that they arrested 
defendant for possession of cocaine) does not invalidate the 
arrest for lack of probable cause. The United States Supreme 
Court has said: 
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the 
state of mind which is hypothecated by the 
reasons which provide the legal justification 
for the officer's action does not invalidate 
the action taken so long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
the action. 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). See also 
People v. Arterberry, 431 Mich. 381, 429 N.W.2d 574, 575 (1988). 
In sum, because there was probable cause to arrest 
defendant for a violation of either S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) or S 58-
37-8(2)(a)(iii), the officers, incident to defendant's arrest, 
could search his person for weapons, contraband, or other 
evidence of the commission of a crime. Ayala, 762 P.2d at 1113. 
See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to suppress. The evidence was validly seized incident to 
p 
a lawful arrest. 
Perhaps the search of defendant is also sustainable under the 
provision in the warrant that authorizes the search of "any and 
all persons present or anyone arriving during the search" (R. 
69). See generally 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, S 4.5(e) at 230-
33 (1987). However, because the search of defendant is so 
plainly justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, the 
State has chosen not to address that issue. 
_1 A . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /6>t*c"day of October, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
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